Journal of International & Interdisciplinary Business Research
Volume 3 Journal of International & Interdisciplinary
Business Research

Article 3

January 2016

PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION IN HEALTH
INSURANCE WITH COMPREHENSIVE
COVERAGE BENEFITS U.S. HEALTH
INSURERS
Bo Shi
Morehead State University, bo.shi@moreheadstate.edu

Etti G. Baranoff
Virginia Commonwealth University

Thomas W. Sager
The University of Texas at Austin

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.fhsu.edu/jiibr
Part of the Business Commons
Recommended Citation
Shi, Bo; Baranoff, Etti G.; and Sager, Thomas W. (2016) "PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE WITH
COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE BENEFITS U.S. HEALTH INSURERS," Journal of International & Interdisciplinary Business
Research: Vol. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: http://scholars.fhsu.edu/jiibr/vol3/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FHSU Scholars Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of International &
Interdisciplinary Business Research by an authorized editor of FHSU Scholars Repository.

Shi et al.: PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE WITH COMPREHENSIVE C
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Bo Shi, Department of Accounting and Finance, Morehead State University
Dr. Etti G. Baranoff, Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate School of Business, Virginia
Commonwealth University
Thomas W. Sager, Department of Information, Risk, and Operations Management, The University of Texas at
Austin

This paper studies the relationship between product diversification and financial performance in U.S. health
insurers during 2005 – 2014. We focus on diversification among different types of comprehensive coverage –
termed related diversification. We use a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a proxy for product
diversification and measure financial performance by both return on assets and return on capital. We find a
robust positive relationship between product diversification and performance. Moreover, the positive relationship
still holds when the performance measures are adjusted for volatility. These findings support the theoretical
foundation of economies of scope and risk-reduction, as adapted to the U.S. health insurance industry. We also
develop two empirical proxies for the underwriting and asset investment risk taking of health insurers. For health
insurers, the relationship between performance and risk-taking in product and asset management is similar to
other types of insurers. A noteworthy finding is that the positive relationship between product diversification and
performance is stronger during the financial crisis years than in the recent healthcare reform era. This suggests
that diversification as a risk reduction strategy may be less effective when reform changes the healthcare
environment.

Keywords: Product Diversification, U.S. Health Insurers, Performance, Economies of Scope, Risk-Reduction

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, U.S. health insurers have experienced continual macro environment changes. The financial
crisis of 2008 – 2009 challenged health insurers’ asset portfolio management and increased uncertainties on
investment returns. Following the financial market turmoil, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 generated
additional challenges. With major provisions implemented in 2010 – 2014, the ACA has significantly affected the
operations of health insurers generally and their comprehensive lines in particular.1 Health insurance products with
comprehensive coverage include Individual and Group Comprehensive insurance, Federal Employees Health
Benefit Plans (FEHBPs), Medicare Advantage plans, and Medicaid managed care plans. In response to various ACA
requirements, such as the health insurance mandate, health insurance exchanges, Medicaid expansion, and the small
business group insurance requirement, health insurers have been expanding comprehensive coverage product lines.
They have also experienced enrollment shifts among existing comprehensive coverage products. All these changes
have affected the product diversification of health insurers (see Table 1). It is reasonable to inquire if changes in
product diversification affect the financial performance of health insurers. The relationship between product
diversification and firm performance has been studied extensively in economics and finance literature but relatively
little in the health insurance industry.
Our study examines this relationship for U.S. health insurers in the period 2005 – 2014. We have a number
of interesting findings. We find that product diversification in insurance plans with comprehensive coverage is
positively related to health insurers’ performance during 2005 – 2014. In addition, the positive relationship holds
when performance is adjusted for volatility. In other words, product diversification improves insurers’ performance
without adding to the risk. Another insightful observation is that the positive relationship is stronger during the
financial crisis years (2005 – 2009) than the ACA reform years (2010 – 2014). The positive impact of product
diversification on performance and risk-reduction becomes less obvious when each product is affected by the ACA

1

Health Reform Implementation Timeline, the Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, http://kff.org/interactive/implementation-timeline/
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provisions. In addition to these major findings, we see consistent results for the control variables commonly used in
other sectors.
To put our study of product diversification and performance for U.S. health insurers into context, we
review the literature in finance, economics, and insurance industries. The literature has developed various theoretical
foundations such as economies of scope, risk-reduction, and agency theory to interpret sometimes contradictory
relationships empirically observed in different sectors. To our knowledge, no previous studies have addressed this
topic for U.S. health insurers. In this paper, we adapt existing theories to an industry with unique business operation
– U.S. health insurers, who serve as both healthcare services managers and financial intermediaries between
healthcare providers and patients. Economies of scope suggest that comprehensive product diversification is
positively related to health insurer performance. Risk-reduction theory suggests that comprehensive product
diversification is positively related to risk-adjusted performance.
In our empirical study, a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to measure the level of
product diversification. Taking into account the nature of U.S. health insurers’ business, we develop new measures
for their asset investment and underwriting risk taking. Since health insurers need high liquidity for paying claims,
we propose as asset risks measure the proportionate value of the asset portfolio that is invested in low liquidity and
low quality investments. As to underwriting risk, we observe empirically that Medicaid managed care plans exhibit
the greatest volatility of underwriting performance during 2005-2014. We propose as product risk the ratio of
Medicaid covered members to total members in all comprehensive plans of the insurer. The data are extracted from
health insurers’ annual financial statements filed with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC). Fixed effect panel regression adjusted for the endogeneity of product diversification is run to estimate the
empirical model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II is an introduction to U.S. health insurers’ business
operation; Section III reviews relevant literature and develops major hypotheses; Section IV discusses the model,
variables, and statistical methods; Section V presents empirical results; and Section VI concludes the paper.

U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY BUSINESS OPERATIONS
As insurance companies, health insurers are similar to life/health and property-liability insurers in that they
underwrite insurance policies and manage asset portfolios. Health insurers collect premiums by underwriting health
insurance policies and pay for claims to healthcare providers when medical services are delivered to insureds. For
insurers to be profitable, premiums collected need to surpass the amount of claims plus the underwriting cost. In
addition to underwriting health insurance policies, health insurers manage investment portfolios that serve as sources
of funds to pay claims and that generate investment income. More than most other types of insurers, health insurers
need liquidity in their asset portfolios because medical claims need to be reimbursed on a fast and frequent basis.
Therefore, the majority of their asset portfolios is invested in high quality and liquid asset classes such as short-term
money market securities, government bonds and high grade corporate bonds.
Most importantly, health insurers manage the delivery of healthcare services to insureds through their
provider networks, a process called ‘managed care’. Managed care both extends and limits services. On the one
hand, a health insurer builds up its provider network by contracting with a number of healthcare providers and
signing ‘managed care contracts’. These contracts specify extensive services to be delivered. Major terms usually
include healthcare service type, quantity, reimbursement rate and method. The goal of the managed care contract is
to align healthcare providers’ and insurers’ interests in terms of cost containment and healthcare quality
improvement. On the other hand, insurers control policyholders’ healthcare service utilization by managed care
techniques such as gatekeepers, pre-authorization, copays, and deductibles. Insurers’ varying managed care skills
affect medical claim costs.
Health insurers underwrite various health insurance products with respect to coverage, insured population,
and payer. Major types of products include Individual/Group Comprehensive, Federal Employee Health Benefit
Plans (FEHBPs), Medicaid Managed Care, Medicare Advantage, Dental, Vision, and Medicare Part D (Prescription
Drug). Among these, Dental, Vision, and Prescription Drug cover only partial healthcare needs. Individual/Group
Comprehensive, FEHBPs, Medicaid, and Medicare provide comprehensive medical coverage. For products with
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comprehensive coverage, insured populations and payers are different. Individual Comprehensive insurance is paid
by individuals not qualified for Medicare or Medicaid. Group Comprehensive insurance is paid by employers to
cover employees’ healthcare plans. FEHBPs are paid by the federal government to cover federal government
employees’ medical needs. Medicare Advantage plans are paid by Medicare beneficiaries. And Medicaid managed
care plans are financed by state and federal government to cover indigent population’s medical needs. Therefore,
health insurers with more than one product line collect premiums from different payers and navigate different
patients on their physician networks. Our study focuses on insurers with majority of business operations in insurance
products with comprehensive coverage: Individual/Group Comprehensive, FEHBPs, Medicare, and Medicaid.

LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
The relationship between product diversification and firm performance has been studied extensively in the
finance literature (Stultz, 1990, Graham et al., 2002, Villalonga, 2004a and 2004b, Santalo and Becerra, 2008,
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010). In the insurance literature, similar studies have examined life/health and
property/liability insurance industries (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008, Elango, et al., 2008, Cummins, et al., 2010).
To explain product diversification – firm performance relationship, researchers extended theories such as economies
of scope, agency theory, and risk-reduction. But empirical studies do not provide conclusive results because of
sample and research design limitations in different industries. To explore this important relationship for U.S. health
insurance industry, we adapt existing theories to U.S. health insurers considering the special nature of business
described in Section II and formulate the following hypotheses.
Economies of scope dominate agency theory: product diversification is expected to improve performance of
U.S. health insurers with major business in comprehensive products.
Health insurers with major business in comprehensive products may benefit from product diversification
when economies of scope are realized. Teece (1980) defined economies of scope as the internalization of knowhow
and other inputs common to two or more production processes. Berger, et al. (1999) contended that economies of
scope can originate from cost complementarity such as sharing the input and managerial expertise. Similarly, in
studying Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) efficiency, Given (1996) summarized economies of scope as
‘the existence of a fixed cost or ‘quasi-public’ input that can be utilized in the production of a number of different
outputs’. In fact, the business operation features of health insurers with major business in comprehensive products
favor the realization of economies of scope. Besides sharable fixed cost of underwriting, claim processing, and
administration among different products that are common to the other industries, sharable physician network
provides health insurers a unique cost advantage as follows. First, though payers and population demographics vary,
patients with comprehensive coverage can be taken care of on the same physician network. This saves insurers’
managed care contracting cost substantially. Second, managed care skills aiming at healthcare cost saving and
quality improvement as described in Section II are applicable across product lines with comprehensive coverage.
However, the cost advantage of physician networks will not be significant if health insurers diversify to product
lines with partial coverage such as dental and vision insurance since new physician networks would be needed.
Finally, diversification of products with comprehensive coverage may increase the enrollment, which improves
insurers’ bargaining power in negotiating managed care contracts with providers. Insurers possessing more
bargaining power get more favorable reimbursement rate to providers (Sorensen 2003 and Wu 2009). The favorable
reimbursement rate lowers insurers’ medical costs among multiple comprehensive product lines, which results in
better performance. Therefore, from the perspective of economies of scope, diversification of products with
comprehensive coverage is expected to benefit health insurers.
On the other hand, insurers may diversify, but diversification may not benefit firm performance. The type
of diversification, unrelated or related, may be an important factor. Agency theory has been proposed as a possible
explanation. Aminud and Lev (1981) advanced the agency cost model and attributed firm diversification to
managers’ risk-reduction in their non-diversifiable employment risk. Jensen (1986) and Stultz (1990) proposed that
managers have an incentive to increase managerial perquisites in order to improve their power and compensation.
Diversification under these managerial concerns may not be value maximizing for insurers or their investors.
Moreover, this also may explain firms’ diversification to unrelated business, which generates even greater penalty.
In fact, using the Business Information Tracking Series (BITS) data, Villalonga (2004a) found evidence of a
discount penalty for unrelated diversification but a premium for related diversification. In our study, we focus on the
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diversification among comprehensive health insurance products, which is related diversification. Even though
payers and population demographics vary, comprehensive lines of health products share similarities. Most
importantly, comprehensive products may share the same physician network and managed care skills. Thus, we
expect that the agency cost generated by managerial perquisites might be minor for health insurers that diversify in
comprehensive health products.
Payer mix and insured population mix reduce health insurers’ performance volatility: product diversification
is expected to improve risk-adjusted performance of U.S. health insurers.
Diversified firms with imperfectly correlated cash flows from different lines of business can reduce the
overall income volatility or the firm risk (Lewellen, 1971, Cummins, et al., 2001, and Cummins and Trainer, 2009).
Firm risk-reduction decreases the cost of financial distress and increases the debt capacity. Using data on the
issuance of public bonds by U.S. corporations 1990 – 2007, Franco, et al. (2010) found diversified firms paid
significantly lower bond-offering yields. Hann, et al. (2013) also found lower cost of capital for diversified firms.
This study focuses on comprehensive health coverage, which offers a variety of payers and insured
subpopulations with different demographics. As described in Section II, each comprehensive health product line
collects premium income from a different source (individuals, employers, federal or state government). And each
product line covers different subpopulations that differ in age, employment status, and morbidity, which result in
varying claim costs. Each product line is underwritten independently. The underwriting results measured by loss
ratios or medical loss ratios are imperfectly correlated because of the payer mix and population demographics mix.
Therefore, it is expected that the overall firm performance volatility or risk can be reduced and health insurers’ cost
of capital is lowered accordingly. Further, the capital cost savings may boost health insurers’ performance. Thus, we
expect that diversification of products with comprehensive health coverage may benefit health insurers’ riskadjusted performance.

MODEL, VERIABLES, AND STATISTICAL METHODS
In this section, we present the model and variables to test hypotheses developed for health insurers.
Statistical methods are also discussed.
Model
Performancei,t = α + β1 × Sizei,t + β2 × AssetRiski,t + β3 × UnderwritingRiski,t
+ β4 × ProdDiveri,t + δ × ControlVarsVectori,t + γ × YearDummies + εi,t
The above model is the main statistical model we use in the analysis. The key research question to test is
whether the level of diversification (ProdDiver) is significantly related to the health insurers’ performance,
controlling for the other covariates. In the statistical model, we are going to examine whether β4 in the above model
is statistically significant. The sign of β4 determines whether diversification results in performance premium or
discount. If economies of scope prevail, we expect to see significant and positive β4. In the meantime, the model is
capable of testing the impact of economies of scale by examining statistical significance of β1. Moreover, β2 and β3
shows whether taking more asset risk and underwriting risk result in better performance as predicted by risk-return
relationship. In addition, a vector of control variables includes predictors that are commonly used in the empirical
literature in insurance industries such as type of organizational form and group affiliation.2

2

Financial leverage is another control variable frequently used in firm performance literature. In the insurance industry, more capital lowers an
insurer’s probability of financial distress (Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997). And insurers with lower financial risk are able to charge higher price for
insurance policies with similar coverage than insurers with higher financial risk (Sommer 1996). Unlike other types of insurers, health insurers
may experience more uncertainties on claim cost and they need more capital to avoid insolvency. We examined the leverage of health insurers
included in our sample 2005 – 2014. The industry practice is consistent and stable. The mean leverage level is maintained at above 0.50 all
through, which is much higher compared to the other insurer types. More interestingly, the minimum leverage level is always around 0.40, and
the standard deviation is always below 0.2. These statistics show that leverage does not vary from firm to firm significantly for health insurers
underwriting comprehensive coverage products. In the meantime, leverage is usually endogenous in firm performance studies, which causes
econometric difficulties. Therefore, we decide to exclude it from the analysis.
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Variable Definitions
Performance Measure
Return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) in either book or market value are commonly used
financial performance measures in finance, banking, and insurance literature (Amit and Livant, 1988, Brown,
Carson, and Hoyt, 2001, Lai and Limpaphayom, 2003). Recently, researchers use Risk-Adjusted ROA (RAROA) or
ROE (RAROE) to incorporate return volatility through years (Browne, et al., 2000, Elango, et al. 2008, and Berger,
et al. 2010). We examine the financial performance of health insurers using both return-type and risk-adjusted return
type measures. Following the previous literature, ROA is constructed as the current year net income divided by the
book value of total assets. Randomly high or low return in a year usually results from the risk-taking in underwriting
and asset portfolio investment. Risk-adjusted return on asset (RAROA) is meant to compensate for this impact.
Following Elango, et al. (2008), we calculate RAROA as the current year ROA divided by the standard deviation of
ROA in the past three years. In addition to return on assets, we examine return on capital (ROC) and risk-adjusted
return on capital (RAROC) instead of return on equity since majority of health insurers are not publicly traded
companies, and so lack market equity values.
Diversification Measure
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly used measure for the level of diversification in
industrial organization studies in economics. Researchers in finance and insurance industries also employ HHI or
modified versions of HHI in product line mix and concentration research (Tombs and Hoyt, 1994, Sommer, 1996,
Pottier and Sommer, 1997, and Elango, Ma, and Pope, 2008). Besides the primary HHI or modified HHI, entropy
measure is first introduced by Jacquemin and Berry (1979) to incorporate different business segment information
and to quantify unrelated product diversification. In our study, we use the primary HHI measure for the level of
product diversification because we focus on insurers with majority of business in products with comprehensive
coverage, which is under the same segment. Following Berry (1971) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990), we define
the level of product diversification as:
n

ProdDiver = 1 − ∑ Pi 2
i =1

Pi is the ratio of current year members covered by product i in proportion to total current year members in all
products with comprehensive coverage. For each insurer included in the sample, there will be Individual
Comprehensive, Group Comprehensive, FEHBPs, Medicare, and Medicaid to be included in the ProdDiver
calculation. 3 Therefore, the minimum level of product diversification is 0, which means that the insurer focuses on
one line of business only. And the maximum level of product diversification is 0.8, which means that the insurer
writes all five lines of business evenly in terms of covered members. The higher value of ProdDiver means higher
level of diversification. Table 1 shows the comprehensive product diversification trend for the entire industry 2005 –
2014. The industry HHI was only 0.5350 in 2005 and it went up continuously to 0.7345 by 2014. The health
insurance industry has been evolving to be more and more diversified. Based on theoretical foundation developed in
Section III, economies of scope / scale and risk-reduction, we expect that ProdDiver is positively related to both
return and risk-adjusted return.

3

ProdDiver = 1 – (Individual Comprehensive Members Current Year2 + Group Comprehensive Members Current Year2 + FEHBPs Members
Current Year2 + Medicare Members Current Year2 + Medicaid Members Current Year2) / (Individual Comprehensive Members Current Year +
Group Comprehensive Members Current Year + FEHBPs Members Current Year + Medicare Members Current Year + Medicaid Members
Current Year)2.
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Table 1 U.S. Health Insurance Industry Diversification Level of Comprehensive Coverage Products using
Members
Individual
Comprehensive
Members

Group
Comprehensive
Members

FEHBPs
Members

Medicare
Members

Medicaid
Members

Total
Comprehensive
Coverage
Members

Industry
Herfindahl*

Year

N

2005

550

5,875,339

54,718,056

5,776,744

4,197,328

13,024,496

83,591,963

0.5350

2006

573

6,436,847

54,990,911

6,086,830

4,868,529

14,603,305

86,986,422

0.5587

2007

585

6,757,025

53,077,264

6,404,091

5,447,749

15,255,769

86,941,898

0.5811

2008

610

7,024,816

50,824,128

6,269,410

6,244,833

16,761,757

87,124,944

0.6059

2009

594

7,948,197

48,337,939

6,242,740

7,255,169

18,908,974

88,693,019

0.6378

2010

576

8,504,356

44,753,597

6,218,916

7,443,587

20,794,618

87,715,074

0.6618

2011

567

8,989,823

43,549,298

7,143,815

8,210,405

22,728,013

90,621,354

0.6819

2012

565

9,233,946

42,373,230

7,413,978

9,026,004

25,118,384

93,165,542

0.6949

2013

564

9,267,007

40,895,443

7,272,919

9,866,733

24,759,132

92,061,234

0.7025

2014 604
13,456,042
35,295,574
7,121,185
12,329,358
33,075,917
101,278,076
0.7345
* Industry Herfindahl is industry-based, not firm-based. It is constructed using the summation of members in each comprehensive
line of business in the study as shown in the table.

Underwriting Risk Measure
To measure health insurers’ underwriting risk-taking, we propose an empirical proxy: percentage of
Medicaid members in comprehensive product portfolio. Health insurers with major business in comprehensive
products may underwrite Individual/Group Comprehensive, FEHBPs, Medicare Advantage, and Medicaid managed
care plans. And underwriting performance can be measured by medical loss ratio (MLR), calculated as medical
claim cost as a percentage of premium income. High MLR may lead to financial loss. In terms of risk, the variability
of MLR throughout time shows how well insurers may control the risk pool of each line of business. High
variability of MLR means that insurers’ underwriting performance varies wildly or is risky. Among products with
comprehensive coverage, different payers and population demographics expose health insurers to different MLR
variability. In Table 2, we use two ways to examine MLR variability of each comprehensive product line
(calculation details are explained in the table notes). Both methods show that Medicaid exposed health insurers to
the highest MLR variability historically. Therefore, we propose to use the percentage of Medicaid members in
health insurer’s comprehensive product lines as the underwriting risk measure. If the classical risk-return
relationship prevails in comprehensive health insurance products, we expect a positive relationship between
Underwriting Risk and performance measured by returns. However, when risk-taking has been taken into account
for performance measured by risk-adjusted return, the positive relationship is not expected any more.
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Table 2 Standard Deviation of MLR by Product across the Industry 2005 - 2014
Year

Comprehensive
MLR

FEHBPs MLR

Medicare MLR

Medicaid MLR

2005

0.1263

0.1796

0.2099

0.1988

2006

0.1221

0.1465

0.1866

0.1961

2007

0.1201

0.1345

0.1468

0.2196

2008

0.1380

0.1807

0.1138

0.2295

2009

0.1332

0.1766

0.1207

0.2197

2010

0.1233

0.1431

0.1511

0.1207

2011

0.1191

0.1420

0.1473

0.1490

2012

0.1453

0.1466

0.1228

0.1275

2013

0.1592

0.1516

0.1374

0.1669

2014

0.1372

0.1478

0.1119

0.1300

Mean

0.1324

0.1549

0.1448

0.1758

Weighted Average of MLR Standard Deviation using Firm Members in Each Product as Weights*
0.0415
0.0431
0.0599
0.0626
2005 - 2014
* To validate the risk level for each line of business, we employ two methods to calculate the
average standard deviation of MLR. Method 1 in the top panel, we calculate the standard deviation
of MLR across the entire industry in each year. Method 2 in the bottom panel, we calculate the
standard deviation of MLR within each firm first 2005 – 2014. Then we calculated the weighted
average across the industry using mean memberships 2005 – 2014 as the weights. Detailed
Calculation Method: Step 1: standard deviation of MLR of each product in each firm is taken from
2005 - 2014; Step 2: mean members 2005 - 2014 of each product in each firm is calculated as
weights; Step 3: weighted average of MLR of each product is calculated using weights in step 2.

Asset Risk Measure
Health insurers manage investment portfolios to maintain timely claims reimbursement to providers and to
generate investment income. More return is expected by taking more investment risk. Among invested asset classes,
stock, mortgages, and real estate are identified as riskier investment (Browne, et al. 2001). Elango et al. (2008) used
these three asset classes, as percentage of total invested assets, for property-liability insurers’ asset risk taking.
Baranoff, et al. (2007) developed the opportunity asset risk, a volatility-based measure, to quantify life insurers’
asset risk-taking. Unlike other types of insurers, health insurers are in greater need of liquid assets to reimburse
healthcare providers quickly and frequently. Moreover, the high risk level of health insurance products may generate
unexpected liquid asset needs.4 In fact, liquidity is indeed health insurers’ major concern to maintain the
underwriting business even though taking less asset risk may erode the investment income (Table 3). Therefore,
liquid and high quality asset classes (cash and short-term investment, U.S. Treasuries with less than 5 years
maturity, and high quality corporate bonds) in percentage of total invested asset represents safe asset investment and
the rest is used as asset risk proxy in our study. Table 3 gives an overview of asset holdings on liquid and high
quality asset classes by U.S. health insurers historically. The data shows that U.S. health insurers with major
business in comprehensive products always held at least 50% of liquid and high quality assets on average. During
the financial crisis years 2008 – 2009, health insurers took the lowest asset risk at below 40%. Similar to the product
risk-taking, health insurers may expect more investment returns by taking more asset risk. If the classical risk-return
relationship holds, we expect positive relationship between Asset Risk and performance measured by returns.
However, when risk-taking has been taken into account for performance measured by risk-adjusted return, the
positive relationship is not expected any more.

4
Baranoff, et al. (2007) extended Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to rank risk level of life insurers’ products. And health insurance carries
the highest product risk.
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Table 3 U.S. Health Insurance Industry Investment on Liquid Asset Classes 2005 - 2014 in Millions

Year

N

2005

550

$

6,491.54

U.S.
Treasury
with 1 - 5
Yrs Maturity
$ 7,424.82

2006

573

$

6,290.33

$

2007

585

$

9,258.60

2008

610

2009

594

2010

U.S. Treasury
with < 1 Yr
Maturity

High Quality
Corporate
Bonds*

Cash and
Short-Term
Investment

Total Invested
Assets

Pct. of
Liquid
Assets

Asset
Risk

$ 25,956.28

$ 16,817.42

$

96,308.82

58.86%

41.14%

7,711.19

$ 29,852.71

$ 20,138.41

$ 110,484.70

57.92%

42.08%

$

7,038.11

$ 33,032.46

$ 22,010.64

$ 119,586.22

59.66%

40.34%

$ 10,182.41

$

7,362.88

$ 31,915.46

$ 21,339.21

$ 114,207.24

61.99%

38.01%

$

8,234.14

$

9,025.93

$ 38,478.85

$ 23,167.16

$ 122,978.27

64.16%

35.84%

576

$

8,916.74

$

9,453.56

$ 41,180.93

$ 22,600.52

$ 135,806.09

60.49%

39.51%

2011

567

$ 10,569.83

$

9,525.63

$ 42,752.56

$ 24,190.35

$ 146,173.72

59.54%

40.46%

2012

565

$

7,772.36

$

7,891.02

$ 45,052.12

$ 25,623.75

$ 155,042.98

55.69%

44.31%

2013

564

$

8,584.01

$

8,343.07

$ 45,978.41

$ 23,025.26

$ 161,975.56

53.05%

46.95%

2014

604

$

6,158.28

$

8,716.34

$ 50,024.07

$ 25,905.53

$ 165,104.73

55.00%

45.00%

* NAIC designate class 1 - 6 to invested corporate bonds according to asset quality. Class 1 is the highest quality,
Class 2 is the high quality, Class 3-6 are medium, low, lower, and near default. High Quality Corporate Bonds are the
summation of Class 1 and Class 2 corporate bonds.

Firm Size
Firm size is commonly used as the proxy for economies of scale in previous diversification-performance
literature. In studying scope economies in the US insurance industry, Cummins, et al. (2010) differentiated scale
versus scope economics and used logarithm of total assets to measure firm size. Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) also
used natural logarithm of total assets and found positive relationship between the firm size and the performance in
US property-liability insurance industry. In our study, we use the geometric mean of total assets, total liabilities, and
total premium incomes as the proxy for the firm size. Economies of scale benefit health insurers without increasing
firm risks. Therefore, we expect positive relationship between firm size and all performance measures.
Organizational Form
Stock and mutual are two major organizational forms for health insurers. In theory, stock insurers are faced
with the agency cost resulting from the separation of ownership and management (Fama and Jensen, 1983 and
Mayers and Smith, 1988). Since policyholders are the owners of the company, mutual insurers are supposed to result
in less agency issues. However, the finding that stock insurers are more successful than mutual insurers in
minimizing cost in Cummins, et al. (1999) suggests the existence of agency cost in mutual insurers. Liebenberg and
Sommer (2008) also identified better performance for stock insurers in property-liability insurance industry. In our
study, we include a dummy variable N-Type as the control of the organizational form, where a stock insurer has the
value of 1 and a mutual insurer has the value of 0. And the impact of the agency cost on health insurers in different
organizational forms is uncertain.
Group Affiliation
More than 70% of health insurers in our sample are group affiliated. Cummins and Sommer (1996) argued
that group affiliation increased the risk of failure for a group member. They treated the insurance group as a
portfolio of options, which is worth more to shareholders than policyholders. Therefore, policyholders would rather
pay more for policies underwritten by an insurer without group affiliation. Both Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) and
Elango, et al. (2008) found negative relationship between the firm performance and the group affiliation for US
property-liability insurers. However, considering health insurers’ business nature, the impact of group affiliation on
firm performance is uncertain because of the following reasons. First, affiliated health insurers may enjoy broader
physician networks, which gives insurers better access to providers and enable them to channel patients more
efficiently. Second, affiliated insurers might process stronger bargaining power in negotiating managed care
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contracts to get favorable reimbursement terms. In the model, insurers with group affiliation have 1 in the control
variable N-Group and 0 otherwise.
Table 4 presents a summary of all dependent and independent variables used in the analysis. And Table 5
summarizes expected relationships between independent variables and performance measures.
Table 4 Variables Definitions

Independent

Dependent

Variables

Definition

ROA

Net income / total assets

RAROA

ROA / Three-year standard deviation of ROA including the current year

ROC

Net income / Book capital

RAROC

ROC / Three-year standard deviation of ROC including the current year

Size

log(Total assets*Total premiums*Total liabilities)/3

Asset Risk

1 - Sum (U.S. Treasury with Less Than 5 Yrs Maturity, High Quality Corporate
Bonds, Cash and Short-Term Investment)/Total Invested Assets

Underwriting
Risk

Medicaid Members / Total Comprehensive Coverage Members

Prod Diver

Modified Herfindahl index of Individual Comprehensive, Group Comprehensive,
FEHBPs, Medicare, and Medicaid using Members

N-Type

Organizational type (1 = Stock)

N-Group

Group affiliation (1 = Yes)

Table 5 Expected Relationships of Independent and Dependent Variables
Underwriting
Size
Asset Risk
Prod Diver
N-Type
Risk

N-Group

Return

+

+

+

+

+/-

+/-

Risk-Adjusted Return

+

+/-

+/-

+

+/-

+/-

The study uses health insurers’ financial statements annual filings data to National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). And we focus on insurers with more than 90% of business income generated from
comprehensive coverage products. From 2005 to 2014, there are 5,788 firm-years included in the study. Here is the
summary statistics for all variables in selected years:
Table 6 Summary Statistics of Variables in Every Three Years
Variables

2005

2008

2011

2014

Mean

Stdev

Mean

Stdev

Mean

Stdev

Mean

Stdev

ROA

0.0709

0.1546

0.0280

0.1764

0.0608

0.1330

-0.0220

0.1704

RAROA

1.6199

2.8967

1.0922

3.4009

1.2853

2.2791

0.6270

2.8698

ROC

0.1192

0.3827

0.0586

0.4285

0.1078

0.3608

-0.0922

0.4786
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RAROC
Size
Asset Risk
Underwriting
Risk
Prod Diver

1.6148

3.0627

1.3952

3.7911

1.4481

17.6867

1.9934

0.1424

0.4250

0.1976
0.1742

2.7479

0.6600

17.8160

1.9663

0.0471

0.4882

0.3689

0.1895

0.2145

0.2201

3.1746

18.2046

1.9289

18.4275

1.8591

0.1188

0.4476

0.1753

0.4318

0.3532

0.2363

0.3833

0.2506

0.3954

0.2231

0.2228

0.2294

0.2401

0.2396

N = 550

N = 610

N = 567

N = 604

N-Type

397

450

422

424

N-Group

405

444

429

458

Statistical Method
For the 5,788 firm-years in 2005 – 2014 in the analysis, we ran the fixed effect model for the unbalanced
panel data. Year dummies are included in all models. As reported in the finance literature, firms’ diversification
decision is possibly self-selected (Campa and Kedia, 2002 and Villalonga, 2004b). To control for this possible
endogeneity issue, we use the lag of the diversification measure (LagProdDiver) in the statistical model. And we run
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity to make sure that the endogeneity issue is resolved after the
adjustment.5
For the main model, both performance measures (return and risk-adjusted return) are used as alternative
dependent variables. The purpose is to test whether product diversification benefits risk-adjusted return after
controlling for asset and product risk-taking. Besides, using return on capital and risk-adjusted return on capital
instead of return on asset provides robust check of model results. More importantly, we separate the entire sample
into two time periods: the financial crisis period (2005 – 2009) and the ACA reform period (2010 – 2014). The goal
is to check whether impact of product diversification on firm performance still exists and whether the impact exists
in similar way under different market environment.

RESULTS
In this section, we present statistical analysis results on the relationship between comprehensive product
diversification and health insurers’ performance measured by ROA, RAROA, ROC, and RAROC. The major result
in Table 7 covers 2005 – 2014, the entire study period. The sub-period of 2005 – 2009 studies this relationship
during financial crisis (Table 8). And the sub-period of 2010 – 2014 shows the relationship in the healthcare reform
era (Table 9). Results are consistent with our expectations. First, the comprehensive product diversification is
positively related to health insurers’ performance in all time-frame controlling for insurers’ risk-taking on asset
investment and underwriting, firm size, and other control variables. These results are robust using all performance
measures. Second, for asset risk and underwriting risk, the positive relationships only hold for performance
measured by returns. When performance risk is taken into account, the positive contribution from product risk and
asset risk is gone. These observations validate that the risk-return relationship holds for health insurers and the
proxies we propose to measure underwriting and asset risk-taking are effective. More importantly, it supports that
product diversification is positively related to insurers’ performance without adding the risk-taking. Finally, another
insightful result is that the positive relationship of product diversification – performance relationship is slightly
stronger during financial crisis period than healthcare reform period. During financial crisis years, product
diversification might balance the negative impact of the financial market turmoil for health insurers. However, when
the healthcare reform is affecting almost all comprehensive product lines, the positive diversification-performance
relationship is dampened.

5

Wooldridge, J. M., 2002, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, The MIT Press, Page 118
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Major Results: health insurers with major business in comprehensive products 2005 – 2014
Table 7 Fixed-Effect Panel Regression Analysis Results 2005 - 2014
ROA
RAROA
ROC
RAROC
Variables
Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value
-0.2182
<.0001
-5.5422
<.0001
-0.5991
<.0001
-4.6568
<.0001
Intercept
0.0166
<.0001
0.4150
<.0001
0.0438
<.0001
0.3969
<.0001
Size
0.0099
0.0509
0.0861
0.4763
0.0269
0.0413
0.2219
0.0659
Asset Risk
0.0167
0.0031
-0.0519
0.6995
0.0372
0.0112
0.0540
0.6876
Underwriting Risk
0.0362
0.0006
0.5102
0.0416
0.0864
0.0015
1.0000
<.0001
LagProd Diver
0.0366
<.0001
0.4151
0.0003
0.1033
<.0001
0.5895
<.0001
N-Type
0.0153
0.0019
0.1591
0.1770
-0.0305
0.0176
-0.1061
0.3670
N-Group
N=5,144
N=5,142
N=5,144
N=5,142
Adj. R2=0.0900
Adj. R2=0.0602
Adj. R2=0.0760
Adj. R2=0.0618

The main results in Table 7 confirm most of our expectations on relationships of predetermined variables
with U.S. health insurers’ performance. First, the coefficient of Lag Prod Diver is positive and significant at 1%
level in three of the performance measures. Health insurers with higher level of comprehensive product
diversification experienced better performance measured by ROA and ROC. More importantly, the positive impact
is even stronger for risk-adjusted returns, RAROA and RAROC, which supports theoretical foundation of
economies of scope and/or risk-reduction. Second, coefficient of size is always highly significant at 1% and positive
using all performance measures. Economies of scale work perfectly for health insurers. Third, for the two risk-taking
measures we introduce, asset risk and underwriting risk, their relationships with firm performance are also as
expected. For underwriting risk, we use the proportion of Medicaid members in total comprehensive members as the
empirical proxy. More underwriting risk-taking is positively related to higher firm performance and the relationship
is highly significant. As to asset risk, we use the proportion of asset classes with less liquidity and lower quality in
investment portfolios as the proxy. The higher investment performance is expected for higher asset risk-taking
considering experience in the other insurance industries. Results show that more asset risk-taking was not improving
firm performance so significantly using all performance measures. Though the equation using ROA as the
dependent variable produces significant coefficient for Asset Risk at 10%, the magnitude is marginal at 0.0099.
However, the result again confirms that liquidity, instead of generating investment income, should be health
insurers’ major concern. Other important observations regarding Underwriting Risk and Asset Risk are the
insignificant coefficients when performance variability is controlled using RAROA and RAROC. On the one hand,
results confirm that the better performance in ROA and ROC equations is generated from more risk-taking. On the
other hand, results on Underwriting Risk and Asset Risk highlight the positive impact of product diversification on
firm performance from the perspective of economies of scope and risk-reduction instead of risk-taking. Finally,
results on control variables are similar to findings in the other insurance sectors. Stock insurers (N-Type = 1)
performed better. As to group affiliation (N-Group = 1), result using ROC as the dependent variable is consistent
with findings in the other insurance industries.
The Financial Crisis Period 2005 – 2009
Table 8 Fixed-Effect Panel Regression Analysis Results 2005 – 2009
ROA
RAROA
ROC
RAROC
Variables
Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value
-0.2023
<.0001
-6.0480
<.0001
-0.5324
<.0001
-3.7077
0.0002
Intercept
0.0163
<.0001
0.4434
<.0001
0.0427
<.0001
0.3622
<.0001
Size
0.0003
0.9682
0.0704
0.7018
0.0021
0.9082
0.2062
0.1919
Asset Risk
0.0108
0.2040
-0.1787
0.4059
0.0292
0.1723
0.0645
0.7271
Underwriting Risk
LagProd Diver
0.0434
0.0058
0.3690
0.3513
0.1220
0.0020
1.0793
0.0015
N-Type
0.0207
0.0034
0.0461
0.7961
0.0574
0.0012
0.2439
0.1111
N-Group
0.0146
0.0369
0.2126
0.2285
-0.0409
0.0200
-0.1397
0.3571
N=2,563
N=2,562
N=2,563
N=2,562
Adj. R2=0.0678
Adj. R2=0.0543
Adj. R2=0.0601
Adj. R2=0.0618
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During the financial crisis years, taking more asset risk or product risk no longer brought higher returns or
risk-adjusted returns for health insurers. Coefficients of Asset Risk and Underwriting Risk are not significant any
more. However, product diversification helped health insurers weather the financial turmoil. The coefficient of Lag
Prod Diver at 0.0434 is greater than the whole period result of 0.0362 and highly significant in the ROA equation.
Greater coefficients are also observed in ROC and RAROC equations. For the other control variables, economies of
scale still work for large insurers in securing better performance.
The Healthcare Reform Period 2010 – 2014
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 revamps the entire healthcare industry. Major provisions of ACA
affect almost all comprehensive health insurance products. Under these substantial changes in the healthcare market,
diversification does not work as effectively as before. In ROA equation, the coefficient of Lag Prod Diver at 0.0311
is lower than results during financial crisis years and significant at 5% level. Risk-takings in asset and product again
relate positively to performance after the turmoil of the financial crisis. Coefficients of the other control variables
did not change significantly.
Table 9 Fixed-Effect Panel Regression Analysis Results 2010 – 2014
ROA
RAROA
ROC
RAROC
Variables
Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value
-0.2590
<.0001
-5.3575
<.0001
-0.7114
<.0001
-5.8331
<.0001
Intercept
0.0164
<.0001
0.3771
<.0001
0.0431
<.0001
0.4228
<.0001
Size
0.0209
0.0030
0.2606
0.0950
0.0587
0.0019
0.2405
0.1893
Asset Risk
0.0221
0.0030
0.0820
0.6202
0.0444
0.0270
0.0443
0.8197
Underwriting Risk
0.0311
0.0265
0.6772
0.0297
0.0578
0.1256
0.9675
0.0082
LagProd Diver
0.0527
<.0001
0.8068
<.0001
0.1493
<.0001
0.9312
<.0001
N-Type
0.0152
0.0288
0.0793
0.6083
-0.0210
0.2628
-0.0820
0.6515
N-Group
N=2,581
N=2,580
N=2,581
N=2,580
Adj. R2=0.0686
Adj. R2=0.0889
Adj. R2=0.0615
Adj. R2=0.1095

CONCLUSION
U.S. health insurers have been challenged since the financial crisis of 2008 – 2009. Following the financial
crisis, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) took effect in 2010 and has been restructuring the whole industry ever since.
Major provisions of the ACA such as health insurance mandate, Medicaid expansion, health insurance exchanges,
and small business group insurance requirement affect most of health insurers’ comprehensive product lines. At this
critical moment, our study presents a picture on historical and ongoing relationships between product diversification
and firm performance for this industry.
In theory, economies of scope, risk-reduction, and agency theory were developed to explain the
diversification-performance relationship in finance, economics and insurance. We adapt these theories to the unique
business operations of U.S. health insurers. Theories predict that product diversification in comprehensive lines of
business is positively related to health insurers’ performance even when performance risk is controlled.
To facilitate the empirical study, we employ the commonly used measure for the level of product
diversification, modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Moreover, we develop new measures for health
insurers’ risk-taking in underwriting and asset investment taking account of the nature of health insurers’ business.
The proportion of asset classes with low liquidity and low quality in investment portfolios is used to proxy the asset
risk because health insurers need high liquidity and quality of their assets to reimburse healthcare providers
promptly. The proportion of Medicaid managed care members in health insurers’ product portfolio is treated as the
underwriting risk since Medicaid MLR experienced highest volatility throughout the years.
Using health insurers’ annual financial statements filings data to NAIC, we find that product diversification
among Individual/Group Comprehensive insurance, Federal Employee Health Benefit Plans, Medicare Advantage
plans, and Medicaid managed care plans is positively related to health insurers’ performance 2005 – 2014. And the
positive relationship holds when performance volatility is controlled. This finding is consistent with other insurance
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sectors. And it is illuminating to health insurers because results show that product diversification improved insurers’
performance without adding risk. An interesting observation is that the positive relationship is not so strong when
each line of business in the product portfolio is affected by ACA provisions in the reform years. In fact, this finding
supports the theoretical foundation of risk reduction: when the systematic risk increases, each product in the
portfolio is affected and the diversification effect is dampened.
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